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REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN
UNION’S RIGHT TO INTERVENE
Ntombizozuko Dyani-Mhango
INTRODUCTION

T

he African Union (“AU”) has reserved for itself a right to
intervene in cases of crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide.1 This Article reflects on the AU’s right to
intervention in order to ascertain what this right entails and
also, how the AU has dealt with it so far. The AU law requires,
and international law allows, for the AU to exercise its right to
intervene in a member state where international crimes are
being committed. In short, the AU has a legal duty to intervene, evidenced by the codification of this duty in the AU’s
Constitutive Act and by the establishment of organs that play
crucial roles in allowing the AU to exercise this right.


LL.B, LL.M (Western Cape, South Africa); SJD (Wisconsin): Associate Professor, Wits University School of Law. This Article forms part of the Thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the SJD degree with
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. This publication was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The
statements made and views expressed are, however, solely the responsibility
of the author.
1. Article 4(h) of the African Union (“AU”) Constitutive Act provides that
the AU has the right to intervene in a member state in “grave circumstances,
namely, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.” Constitutive
Act of the African Union art. 4(h), May 26, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Constitutive Act]. The Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted at the thirtysixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of
the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) in Lome, Togo, on July 11, 2000
and entered into force on May 26, 2001. Id. at 33–34, 44–46. See Dan Kuwali,
Art. 4(H) + R2p: Towards a Doctrine of Persuasive Prevention to End Mass
Atrocity Crimes, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 55, 55 (2008–2009); Jonathan D.
Rechner, From The OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for
Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 543, 544, 562 (2006); J. Emeka Wokoro, Towards a Model for
African Humanitarian Intervention, 6 REG. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2008); Eliav
Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in Internal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337,
369 (2011); Vincent O. Nmehielle, The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human Rights Protection in Africa?, 7 SING. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 412, 414 (2003); Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 157, 163-64 (2003).
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However, the AU still needs to resolve some impediments
that may bar it from exercising its right to intervene in a member state in whose territory crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide are being committed. Among the impediments that need to be resolved is the need to clarify the meaning of the right to intervene, which is not currently defined anywhere in the AU treaties, decisions, or resolutions. Further,
the AU may also be barred from exercising this right as it appears that the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and
territorial integrity of the AU member states are interpreted
restrictively. The AU must deal with these issues before an attempt to exercise the right to intervene is made.
Part I of this Article explains the background to the formation of the AU and how international and African communities have addressed atrocities in Africa in the past. Part II discusses the meaning of the AU’s right to intervene, and examines the relationship between the AU and the United Nations
Security Council with regard to the issues of peace and security
in the African region. Part III then describes the interventions
exercised by the AU so far.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE AU
The current African regional system began with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”). The
OAU was established by the OAU Charter in May 1963.2 Although the OAU Charter refers to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in its preamble and in a provision outlining the
purposes of the OAU, the priorities of the OAU Heads of State
and Government (“OAU Assembly”) were not human rights.3
2. For a critical analysis of the OAU, see generally Alfred W. Chanda,
The Organization of the African Unity: An Appraisal, 21–24 ZAMBIA L.J. 1
(1989-92).
3. See Gino J. Naldi, Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa: The Increased Role of the OAU?, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000 at 2 (Malcolm D. Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2002). The purposes of the OAU are outlined in Art. 2(1) of
the OAU Charter as follows:
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
(b) To co-ordinate and intensify their cooperation and effort to
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereign, their territorial integrity and independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
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Instead, the OAU Assembly was “[d]etermined to safeguard
and consolidate the hard-won independence, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and fight
against neo-colonialism in all its forms.”4 Therefore, the OAU
Charter emphasized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
its member states, and enjoined those members from interfering in the internal affairs of other states.5 The following three
over-riding principles guided the OAU for thirty-nine years:6
First, all states were sovereign equals. Each state would have
an equal say, with no greater weight given to larger or more
powerful states. Second, states agreed not to interfere in the
domestic affairs of fellow members. Third, territorial borders
were sacrosanct, with no room for alteration in the status quo.
Adoption of these principles reflected a bitter colonial experience. No longer did states want to be dominated by outsiders
or risk border changes that would unleash ethnic rivalries
and invite outside intervention.7

(e) To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
Charter of the Organization of African Unity [OAU Charter] art. 2(1), May
25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 70.
4. Id. at 70. See Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43,
43 (1992) (noting that the founders of the OAU did not focus on human rights
policy in the original OAU Charter).
5. See OAU Charter art. 3 (including “peaceful settlement of disputes by
negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;” “unreserved condemnation . . . of political assassination;” “absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;” and “affirmation of a
policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs,” as its principles). For a discussion of the principles of the OAU, see generally T.O. ELIAS, AFRICA AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Akinjide ed., 2d rev. ed.
1988).
6. MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 204
(2d ed. 2010).
7. Id. See also Naldi, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that “[a]ccount must also
be taken of the fact that the States of Africa, most newly independent, jealously guarded their freedom and deeply resented any measures which hinted
at external interference with their internal affairs.”); John Okpari, Policing
and Preventing Human Rights Abuses in Africa: The OAU, the AU & the
NEPAD Peer Review, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 461, 462 (2004) (arguing that
the OAU was formed primarily to secure “accelerated decolonization of the
continent and the preservation of the territorial integrity” of the newly
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Based on these principles, “heads of state avoided criticizing
each other” during the OAU Assembly sessions, “which led not
only to disappointment but to accusations of the OAU Assembly [as merely] a ‘Heads of State Club,’” instead of being leaders concerned with the human rights violations that were being
committed in some of their territories.8 It is in this regard that
the OAU was accused of being unable to curb conflicts escalating in the continent.9
The OAU leaders have been criticized for the dismal record of
African states regarding the protection of human rights.10 Even
after the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”)11 and the subsequent estabformed independent states); see also Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 412–15, 434–
35 (contending the OAU Charter neither made any express commitments to
the protection of human rights generally nor the achievement of gender
equality in particular as key objectives of the OAU).
8. Ben Kioko, The Right of Intervention Under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, 85, No. 852. INT’L. REV.
RED CROSS 807, 814 (2003); see also Jeremy Sarkin, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect in Africa, in AFRICA’S HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE 45, 56 (John Akokpari & Daniel Shea Zimbler eds., 2008).
9. See P. Mweti Munya, The Organization of African Unity and its Role in
Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation,
19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 537, 538 (1998–1999) (noting the lack of success
from the OAU’s historical record in conflict resolution, and arguing: “The ink
had not even dried on the [OAU] Charter before the continent was plagued by
conflicts, civil wars and a myriad of other problems. The celebrated organization that many had hoped would consolidate continental security and nurture
peace and stability had failed to do so.”) However, Musifiky Mwanasali, From
Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging Doctrine of Conflict Prevention in Africa, in THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 41, 46 (John
Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Mavumba & Tim Murithi eds., 2008), notes that
“The OAU is . . . recogni[z]ed for its efforts to prevent inter-state conflicts,
including the Algeria-Morocco border war of 1963, the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute of the 1970s, and the crisis in the Comoros in the late 1990s and
early 2000.”
10. See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?
The African Union Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1177,
1211 (2002) (noting that during the OAU era “African leaders fiddled while
the edifice called ‘Africa’ was engulfed in conflagrations. Increasing political
repression, denial of political choice, restrictions on freedom of association,
and other human rights violations met with rare murmurs of dissent from
the OAU.”); see also Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 412 (noting that many African states were “engaged in outrageous human rights violations under the
not so watchful eyes of the [OAU]”).
11. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
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lishment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (“ACHPR”),12 OAU member states carried on with gross
human rights violations that can often constitute international
crimes. They also seemingly ignored the provisions of the African Charter and the ACHPR’s pronouncements on human
rights abuses without any apparent fear of repercussions from
the OAU because they perceived that the mechanisms established under the Charter were weak.13 The OAU was still occupied with addressing racism and apartheid in Southern Africa,
so it was not truly concerned with the human rights violations
in the territories of its member states.14 Indeed, one legal
scholar argues that the African Charter was adopted as a result of the pressure from the West.15 The only instances where
the OAU was concerned with the internal affairs of the member states was when the issue pertained to colonialism, domination, and apartheid in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe).16 It is in these instances that the OAU Assembly
June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into
force on Oct. 21, 1986). For a critical analysis of the African Charter, see generally B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with
the European and American Systems, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 141 (1984); Richard Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 667 (1982); Philip Amoah, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—An Effective Weapon for Human Rights?, 4 AFR. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 226 (1992).
12. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by Art. 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights “to
promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa.”
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 11, art. 30. For an
analysis of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see generally EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (1996).
13. Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 413–14.
14. See FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA, 163
(2007) (noting that the OAU “turned a blind eye” when it came to human
rights violations in member states because of the principle of “noninterference”); see also notes 16 and 17 infra discussing the OAU resolutions
and decisions when it came to racism and apartheid in Southern Africa, i.e.,
South Africa and Zimbabwe.
15. See U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 903–04 (1983).
16. U. Oji Umozurike, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter, 78 AFR. AFF. 197, 202 (1979) (noting that the only two exceptions to noninterference are when questions of colonialism or apartheid arose).
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was proactive and passed resolutions that expressly rejected
colonialism, domination, and similar practices, and even called
on its member states to assist in the liberation movements.17
One can argue that the rationale for the OAU’s behavior in
these specific cases stemmed from the OAU Charter, which
clearly stated that the purposes of the OAU were to fight colonization and the dominance of the colonizers.18
The African states began to realize that there was a need to
respond effectively to conflicts as there was a worldwide change
in the early 1990s.19 One factor that led to this change of heart
17. See, e.g., OAU, Resolutions Adopted by First Conference of Independent
African Heads of State and Government Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
O.A.U. Doc. CIAS/PLEN.2/REV.2 (May 22–25, 1963) (agenda items including
decolonization, apartheid, and racial discrimination); see also OAU, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 6(I) (July 17–21,
1964) (“[n]oting with grave concern the consistent refusal of the Government
of South Africa to give consideration to appeals by every sector of world opinion and in particular the resolutions of the [U.N.] Security Council and General Assembly.”); OAU, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in the Republic
of South Africa, ¶¶ 4, 10, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 34 (II) (Oct. 21–26, 1965)
(“call[ing] on all states to institute a strict embargo on the supply of arms and
ammunition and other material for use by military and police forces in South
Africa,” and inviting “the South African liberation movements to concert their
policies and actions and intensify the struggle for full equality, and appeals to
all States to lend moral and material assistance to the liberation movements
in their struggle.”); OAU, Southern Rhodesia, ¶ 1, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 8(I)
(July 17–24, 1964) (requesting the “African States to take a vigorous stand
against a Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia by a European
minority government and to pledge themselves to take appropriate measures,
including the recognition and support of an African nationalist governmentin-exile should such an eventuality arise.”); OAU, Southern Rhodesia, ¶ 6,
O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res 25 (II) (Oct. 21–25, 1965) (resolving “to use all possible
means including force to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence,”
and “to give immediate assistance to the people of Zimbabwe with a view to
establishing a majority government in the country.”); OAU, Territories Under
Portuguesse Domination, ¶ 1, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res 9(I) (“condemning Portugal for its persistent refusal to recognise the right of the peoples under its
domination to self-determination and independence.”).
18. See OAU Charter art. 2(1)(d) (noting that one of the purposes of the
OAU is “[t]o eradicate all forms of colonialism); id. art. 3(6) (including one of
the principles of the OAU: “[a]bsolute dedication to the total emancipation of
the African territories which are still dependent.”).
19. SAMUEL M. MAKINDA & F. WAFULA OKUMU, THE AFRICAN UNION:
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION, SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE 29 (2008) (noting
that “[b]y the early 1990s, globalization and the end of the Cold War had
compelled African states to recognize the structural weakness that had prevented the OAU from responding effectively to conflicts.”).
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was that “it was becoming evident that the West and the [U.N.]
Security Council were not responding promptly to African problems, particularly security matters.”20 The U.N. missions in
Angola21 and in Somalia,22 for example, failed to restore peace
in the countries.23 As a result, it was argued that the failure of
these missions led to an unwillingness on the part of the U.N.
to become involved in African conflicts in general.24 One significant consequence of this reluctance by the U.N. is the failure of
the international community to provide adequate troops or sufficient mandate to the U.N. Mission in Rwanda (“UNAMIR”),
which was on the ground as early as 1994.25 Had the international community acted in time, the genocide and massive sexual violence against women in Rwanda would not have occurred.
Therefore, during the Ouagadougou OAU Summit in 1998,
South Africa’s then President Nelson Mandela told his fellow
leaders that
we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right

20. Id.
21. These missions are UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II and MONUA, which occurred between 1991 and 1999. For the background to the U.N. missions in
Angola, see U.N. Mission of Observers in Angola, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/monua_b.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012).
22. These missions are UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, which were supported by UNITAF and led by the United States (between late 1992 and May
1993). For the background to the U.N. operations in Somalia, see Mission
Backgrounder,
U.N.
Operation
in
Somalia
I,
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2012).
23. See Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, Can the African Union Deliver Peace and
Security?, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 35, 36 (2011).
24. Id.
25. See generally ROMÉO A. DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE
FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004) (giving the account of the failure by
the international community to act during the Rwandan genocide); Rep. of
the Indep. Inquiry into the Action of the U.N. During the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999) (by Ingvar Carlsson, Han
Sung-Joo & Rufus M. Kupolati); INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT
PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE
SURROUNDING EVENTS, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RWANDA: THE
PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE (2000).
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and duty to intervene when behind those sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny.26

This speech is remarkable as former President Mandela specifically defended the right to intervene in member states in the
name of protecting human rights. Soon after this speech, the
OAU Assembly adopted the Constitutive Act, which established
the AU.27
The process leading to the adoption of the Constitutive Act
and the subsequent establishment of the AU began at the Algiers Summit in 1999.28 At this Summit, the AU Assembly was
“deeply convinced the [OAU] ha[d] played an irreplaceable role
in the affirmation of political identity and the realization of the
unity of our continent.”29 The Algiers Summit further identified
new challenges for the future and urged that the continent “enter the Third Millennium with a genuine spirit of cooperation
with restored human dignity and a common hope in an interdependent future for mankind.”30 Then came the Sirte Declaration,31 which was adopted during the OAU’s extraordinary
summit, convened at Libya’s request, “[to deliberate] extensively on ways and means of making the OAU effective so as to
keep pace with the political and economic development taking
place in the world and the preparation required of Africa within the context of globalization so as to preserve its social, economic and political potentials.”32
26. Nelson Mandela, President of the Republic of South Africa,
Address to the Summit Meeting of the OAU Heads of State and Government
(June
8,
1998)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1998/98609_0w1849810090.htm).
27. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 157, (noting that the Constitutive Act
was adopted by the OAU on July 11, 2000, almost two years before the inauguration of the AU). It is the author’s assumption that it was “soon after” the
speech of former President Mandela that the Constitutive Act was adopted.
This is based on the fact that the Constitutive Act in art. 4(h) included the
right to intervene.
28. See Algiers Declaration, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXXV), ¶ 8 (July 12–
14, 1999).
29. Id. ¶ 3.
30. Id. ¶ 8.
31. Sirte Declaration, O.A.U. Doc. EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1 (Sept. 8–9,
1999) [hereinafter Sirte Declaration].
32. OAU, Decisions on the Convening of an Extraordinary Session of the
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Accordance with Article
33(5) of its Rules of Procedure, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec.140 (XXXV) at 22–23
(July 12–14, 1999).
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The OAU Assembly declared that it was also “determined to
eliminate the scourge of conflicts, which constitutes a major
impediment into the implementation of our development and
integration agenda.”33 Thus, the pertinent part of the Sirte
Declaration provides as follows:
8. Having discussed frankly and extensively on how to proceed with the strengthening of the unity of our continent and
its peoples, in the light of those proposals, and bearing in
mind the current situation on the continent, we DECIDE TO:
(i) Establish an African Union, in conformity with the
ultimate objectives of the Charter of our continental
Organization and the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.
(ii) Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty
Establishing the African Economic Community, in
particular:
Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja
Treaty,
Ensure the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for the in the Abuja Treaty, such as the
African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union,
the African Court of Justice and, in particular, the
Pan-African Parliament . . .
Strengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the pillars for achieving the
objectives of the African Economic Community and
realizing the envisaged Union . . . .34

The AU “was officially launched in Durban, South Africa and
effectively replaced the OAU” on July 10–12, 2002.35 During
the inauguration of the AU, former President Thabo Mbeki of
South Africa declared the following:
Together we must work for peace, security and stability for
the people of this continent. We must end the senseless conflicts and wars on our continent which have caused so much
33. Sirte Declaration, supra note 31, ¶ 6.
34. Id. ¶ 8.
35. Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 415. See also, African Union [AU], The
Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organisation of African Unity and on
the Launching of the African Union, A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Decl. 2 (I) (July 10,
2002).
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pain and suffering to our people and turned many of them into refugees and displaces and forced others into exile.36

This brought “hope . . . for a better future for the peoples of Africa.”37 The move from OAU to AU has been argued to be the
first step for Africa to demonstrate its seriousness about protecting human rights and to maintain peace, security, and stability in Africa.38 However, not everyone saw this move as a
promise by the African leaders to the Africans that the AU will
take human rights seriously.39 As such, the AU was seen as “an
old wine in a new wine skin.” 40
However, the Constitutive Act of the AU has provisions that
clearly refer to human rights and armed conflicts in Africa. For
example, the preamble stipulates that African leaders are “conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of
the continent and the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.”41 Consequently, they are “determined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights . . .
and to ensure good governance and the rule of law.”42 Further,
the Constitutive Act provides that its objectives include “promot[ing] and protect[ing] human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the [African Charter] and other human rights instruments.”43

36. Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union, Launch of the African
Union (July 9, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.africauion.org/official_documents/Speeches_&_Statements/HE_Thabo_Mbiki/LAUn
ch%20of%20the%20African%20Union,%209%20July%202002.htm).
37. Id.
38. See Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for Better Protection of
Human Rights in Africa, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 299, 306–07 (2001);see also
Corinne A. A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 379 (2002).
39. Udombana, supra note 10, at 1258, 1259 (arguing that the AU “is not
likely to take human rights seriously—even though that is greatly desired”
and that the “adoption of the [Constitutive Act] has more to do with the hysteria of globalization than the euphoria of unity, or for that matter, human
rights.”).
40. Id., at 1258.
41. See Constitutive Act, at 35.
42. See id.
43. Id. art. 3(h).
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Like the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act also prioritizes
the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
non-interference as the Constitutive Act defends these principles as “a core objective of the [AU]”44 and that the AU will
function in accordance with the principle “of non-interference
by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.”45 On
the other hand, unlike the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act
places limitations on state sovereignty by defining sovereignty
in terms of a state’s willingness and capacity to provide protection to its nationals.46 Further, the end of the Cold War presented African leaders with a set of new challenges, which included the “rethinking of the principle of non-interference” in
the internal affairs of another state.47 The African leaders’ efforts to deal with these challenges required innovation and creativity.48 Thus, it is not surprising that, through the Constitutive Act, the AU has reserved for itself a right to intervene in
cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
The question remains: What does this right to intervene mean?
II. THE AU’S RIGHT TO INTERVENE, SOME POSITIVE OUTCOMES,
AND SOME IMPEDIMENTS
The AU also refers to the right to intervene in the yet-tocome-into-force Kampala Convention on the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons49 and in decisions made
44. See id. art. 3(b).
45. Id. art. 4(g); AU, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union [PSC Protocol] art. 4(f), July 9,
2002,
available
at
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/doc/PSC%20protocol.pdf.
46. See A. Abass & M. Baderin, Towards Effective Collective Security and
Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of
the New African Union, 49 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 19 (2002). Abass and Baderin argue that: “What the AU members contracted out of by giving their
consent to intervention by AU is the principle of ‘non-intervention’. . . .” Further, “[b]y ratifying the AU Act, African states must be understood to have
agreed that the AU can intervene in their affairs accordingly. In empowering
the [AU] to that effect under Article 4(h), the states must be taken to have
conceded a quantum of their legal and political sovereignty to the [AU].” Id.
47. Max Sesay, Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia, 23 REV.
AFR. POL. ECON. 35, 50 (1996).
48. See generally id. (describing challenges that African nations faced during the post-Cold War era).
49. See AU, Convention on the Protection and Assistance of the Internally
Displaced Persons [hereinafter Kampala Convention], at 1–2, Oct. 23, 2009,
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by the AU Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the AU.50
However, neither these treaties (the Constitutive Act and the
Kampala Convention) nor the AU Assembly decisions define
this right.51 As a result, some legal scholars have correctly assumed that the right to intervene confers the right to use of
force and equates to the controversial humanitarian intervention (“HMI”).52 A few scholars even argue that it is preferable to
insist that the AU has a duty to intervene rather than a
“right,” as a “right” implies that the AU does not have to intervene when circumstances that pertain to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide occur.53 A legal duty, on the
available
at
http://www.au.int/en/content/african-union-conventionprotection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa. As of Feb. 10,
2012, only one state has ratified the Convention while twenty-nine states
have signed it, and the Convention needs fifteen ratifications to come into
force. See List of Countries Which Have Signed Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Disputed
Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), AFRICAN UNION (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Convention%20on%20IDPs%20%20displaced..._0.pdf. Art. 8(1) of the Kampala Convention provides that
“[t]he [AU] shall have the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive
Act in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity.” Kampala Convention art. 8(1).
50. See, e.g., AU, Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly’s Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX. CL/670 (XIX), ¶ 2, A.U.
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 366 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011) (reiterating “its
commitment to fight impunity in conformity with the provisions of Article
4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union”) (emphasis added); AU, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction Doc. EX.CL/640
(XVIII), ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 335 (XVI) (Jan. 30–31, 2011) (also
reiterating “its commitment to fight impunity in conformity with the provisions of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union”) (emphasis
added).
51. There is no provision in the Constitutive Act or the Kampala Convention which defines the AU’s right to intervene.
52. See, e.g., Nsongurua Udombana, When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur
Crisis and the Crisis of a Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan, 27 HUM. RTS.
Q. 1149, 1149 (2005) [hereinafter When Neutrality is a Sin]; Jeremy Sarkin,
The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-regional
Organizations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: Connecting
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 53 J. AFR. L. 1,
25 (2009) [hereinafter Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems].
53. See When Neutrality is a Sin, supra note 52, at 1157 n.42 (arguing that
“the use of the word ‘right’ in referring to humanitarian intervention is a
misnomer,” and observing that “[h]uman rights law is created for the benefit
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other hand, may create legal consequences for the AU if it fails
to execute its obligation to intervene as compared to a discretionary “right to intervene.”54 It is important to examine the
content of this right to ascertain its meaning.
According to the Constitutive Act, the criterion for the exercise of intervention by the AU is twofold: first, it may be exercised only in cases of international crimes, such as crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide; and second, assuming that the AU has the necessary resources (financial or
otherwise) to intervene if international crimes are committed
in the territory of a member state, the implication is that the
AU will be willing to exercise the right to intervene.55 The Constitutive Act does not define crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide as its drafters presumed that there was
no need to do so, these crimes being already defined in the
Rome Statute and the statutes of the international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.56 Indeed,
of individuals and casts ‘duties’ on states to intervene to respect, promote,
and fulfill those norms, including the ‘duty’ on other states to intervene to
stop gross human rights violations in another.”).
54. See id.
55. See Constitutive Act art. 4; see also Wokoro, supra note 1, at 21. Woroko argues that:
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its consensual orientation, absence
of a debilitating veto arrangement, and dedication to human rights,
there is scant reason to believe that the African Security Council is
any more potent, effective, or responsible than the U.N. Security
Council, and there is little evidence to support the repudiation of the
sacrosanct sovereignty that characterized the OAU. Indeed, while
the U.S. Congress accused Sudan of genocide in Darfur and strode to
the world stage to rally global support against Sudan, the [AU] stymied those efforts, stating that the dire humanitarian situation in
Darfur “cannot be defined as a genocide.
Id.
56. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was established to prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.”). For the definitions of the crimes contained in the Statute of ICTY,
see U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, at 37–38, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3, 1993). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was
established for the “prosecuti[on] of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
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Professor Maluwa, the AU’s counsel at the time the Constitutive Act was drafted, explains that
[t]he original proposal to incorporate the right of intervention
in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act was heavily debated
during the ministerial meetings that examined the draft texts
in 2000. The limitation of the grounds for intervention to war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity was predicated
on the understanding that these acts are now generally recognized as violations of international law, as evidenced in the
statutes of the international tribunals for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia, and most recently the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. As it presently stands,
therefore, Article 4(h) is in line with current international
law.57

The Rome Statute outlines a specific procedure that is to be followed before an indictment for international crimes may be issued against a perpetrator.58 This includes the collection and
an examination of evidence and the questioning of individuals,
including any victims, by the prosecution team.59 This process
also requires the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) PreTrial Chamber to decide if the issuance of an arrest warrant is
necessary for a particular situation.60
However, for the intervention envisaged in terms of Article
4(h), the Constitutive Act does not provide a procedure to follow.61 It is unclear whether the AU Assembly may first conduct
an investigation before determining if an intervention is neces-

ritory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other
violations in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994 . . . .” S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994). For the definitions of the crimes contained in the Statute of the ICTR,
see id. ¶¶ 3–5.
57. Tiyanjana Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law:
Mapping New Boundaries or Revisiting Old Terrain?, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L.
PROC. 232, 236 (2004) [hereinafter OAU/African Union and International
Law].
58. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 53–58, Jul.
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
59. See id. arts. 51, 54.
60. See id. arts. 53–58.
61. ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO
END MASS ATROCITIES 78 (2009) (arguing that “the AU remains unclear about
both the procedural and substantive conditions” under which the intervention
would be exercised).
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sary, or whether it needs to first decide to intervene before
finding out if indeed international crimes were committed in a
member state.62 Article 4(h) requires that there must be a
commission of an international crime to necessitate an intervention.63 Also, the AU has created organs specifically for the
purpose of going on fact-finding missions, enabling the AU Assembly to decide on whether to take action.64 Therefore, it
makes sense to establish the commission of the international
crime prior to intervention.
There is no institution operational yet to interpret Article
4(h) of the Constitutive Act or the AU Assembly’s decision to
intervene or not to intervene. The African Court of Justice,
which is one of the AU institutions, is not yet operational65
even though the Protocol that establishes it has been in force
since 2009.66 Instead, the AU has decided to adopt a Protocol on

62. Dan Kuwali, The Conundrum of Conditions for Intervention Under
Article 4(h) of the African Union Act, 17 AFR. SECURITY REV. 90, 93 (2008)
(arguing that the Constitutive Act is “silent on how to intervene” and is “incomplete on how to decide when to intervene”). Kuwali also argues that
“[a]lthough the [AU Assembly] can decide on intervention on its own initiative or at the request of a member state pursuant to article 4(j), the provision
does not spell out a clear cut threshold that would warrant intervention.” Id.
63. Constitutive Act art. 4(h).
64. In particular, the AU created the Panel of the Wise, which has already
conducted fact-finding missions in places such as Libya and the Darfur, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo. See Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights
Problems, supra note 53, at 15–16 (discussing the institutional organs of the
AU relevant to the exercise of the right to intervene); see also infra Part III.B
(discussing the institutional organs of the AU relevant to the exercise of the
right to intervene).
65. Constitutive Act art. 5(1)(d). The AU Assembly has not appointed
judges to the African Court of Justice even though the Protocol establishing
the Court has reached the necessary ratifications needed in order to come
into force. See note 68 infra. Instead, the AU Assembly has recently requested the AU Commission and the AfCHPR “to prepare a study on the financial
and structural implications resulting from the expansion of the jurisdiction of
the [AfCHPR] and submit the study along with the Draft Protocol on the
Amendments to the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights for consideration at the next summit slated for January
2013.” See AU, Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.427 (XIX) (July 15–16, 2012).
66. The Protocol of the Court of Justice of the AU came into force on Feb.
11, 2009 after acquiring fifteen ratifications. See List of Countries Which
Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the
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the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“AfCHPR”) and the African Court of Justice into one.67 This
Protocol will replace the prior protocols that established the
AfCHPR and the African Court of Justice.68 The existing Protocol of the African Court of Justice provides that the African
Court of Justice is the AU’s “principal judicial organ,”69 which
will “function in accordance with the provisions of the [Constitutive] Act and this Protocol.”70 Article 18 of the Protocol of the
African Court of Justice establishes personal jurisdiction of the
African Court of Justice, which includes state parties to the
Protocol, the AU Assembly, and other organs of the AU as authorized by the AU Assembly.71
The African Court of Justice has subject matter jurisdiction
over the interpretation and application of the Constitutive
Act;72 any question of international law;73 all acts, decisions,
regulations, and directives of AU organs;74 and circumstances
that would constitute a breach of an obligation owed to a state
party or the AU.75 Thus, the African Court of Justice will be
helpful in interpreting Article 4(h) to ascertain the meaning of
intervention. However, the Constitutive Act provides that if the
African
Union,
AFRICAN
UNION
(Nov.
12,
2012),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Court%20of%20Justice_0.pdf.
67. See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights [Protocol of the Statute of African Court] art. 2, July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M.
317. So far there are only five ratifications for this Protocol. See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on the Statute of
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, AFRICAN UNION (Nov. 12,
2012),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20Statute%20of%20th
e%20African%20Court%20of%20Justice%20and%20HR.pdf.
The
African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (“AfCHPR”) is established by the Organization of African Unity. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
People’s Rights [Protocol to AfCHPR], June 10, 1998, reprinted in 12 AFR. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 187 (2000).
68. Protocol of the Statute of African Court arts. 1, 2.
69. See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union art. 2(2), July
11, 2003, reprinted in 13 AFR. J. INT’L. COMP. L. 115 (2005).
70. Id. art. 2(1).
71. Id. art. 18(1)(a)–(b).
72. Id. art. 19(1)(a).
73. Id. art. 19(1)(c).
74. Id. art. 19(1)(d).
75. Id. art. 19(1)(f).
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organ responsible for its interpretation is not operational, the
AU Assembly can assume such function as long as the decision
reaches a two-thirds majority.76 This may be problematic, especially when it comes to deciding on the meaning of the right to
intervene, as the AU Assembly may be embroiled in disagreements. It is therefore necessary to have an impartial body to
interpret this right. However, the correct assumption has been
that the AU’s right to intervene can be equated to the use of
force.77 This assumption is based on the fact that, in order to
exercise this right, the AU has made provisions for the establishment of an armed force whose responsibility includes intervention as contemplated in the Constitutive Act.78 Less intrusive means of intervention are listed outside this right.79
There has not been an instance where the meaning of the
AU’s right to intervention has been questioned in practical
terms. One hopes that when that time comes the African Court
of Justice will be fully operational.
A. The Relationship Between the AU and the Security Council
on the AU’s Right to Intervene
As mentioned above, the AU has reserved for itself a right to
intervene in a member state where international crimes are
being committed.80 Intervention by use of force triggers the application of the United Nations Charter.81 The U.N. Charter
provides that “[a]ll Members [of the U.N.] shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”82 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
made clear in Nicaragua v. United States that prohibiting the
76. Constitutive Act art. 26.
77. Legal scholars have assumed that the AU’s right to intervene can
mean the use of force. See When Neutrality is a Sin, supra note 52, at 1156–
57; Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems, supra note 52, at 25.
78. See, e.g., PSC Protocol art. 13(1) (establishing the African Standby
Force in order to “enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to . . . intervention pursuant to [A]rticle 4(h) . . . of the
Constitutive Act”).
79. See Constitutive Act art. 23(2) (providing sanctions against member
states that fail to comply with the AU decisions).
80. See id. art. 4(h), (j).
81. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
82. Id.
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use of force is a part of customary international law.83 On the
other hand, the principle of non-intervention does not apply
against the U.N. Security Council when it takes enforcement
measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.84 The Security Council may, in appropriate circumstances, recommend intervention by U.N. forces or by individual states.85 The aim of
the drafters of the U.N. Charter was not only to prohibit the
use of force by states under Article 2(4), but also to centralize
control of the use of force in the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.86 The Security Council therefore
has the primary responsibility to decide on the use of force,
though that power may be delegated to regional organizations.87
The Constitutive Act strongly implies that the AU, not the
Security Council, may assume primary responsibility in cases
of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Africa. In fact, there is nothing in the AU Constitutive Act or in the

83. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27); see also Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 16, ¶
148 (Dec. 19) (reaffirming that this principle is “the cornerstone of the [U.N.]
Charter”).
84. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter provides that “[t]he Security Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 39.
85. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1999), (“According to [the U.N. Charter] provisions,
the Security Council, after having determined that a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred, may, if necessary, take
military enforcement action involving the armed forces of the Member States.
In actual UN practice, it is now common for such enforcement action to be
carried out on the basis of a mandate to, or more frequently of an authorisation of, states which are willing to participate either individually or in ad hoc
coalitions or acting through regional or other international organizations . . .
.”); see also Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on
Israel’s Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 46 (2005) (arguing that the U.N.
Charter does not preclude intervention “provided it is mandated by the Security Council”).
86. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 254–
55 (3d ed. 2008).
87. See U.N. Charter arts. 52–53.
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Peace and Security Council (“PSC”) Protocol88 that expressly
requires the AU to seek prior authorization from the U.N. Security Council before authorizing or exercising intervention.
Instead, the PSC Protocol entrusts to itself the “primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.”89 This is in contrast with the U.N. Charter, which provides,
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 90

On the other hand, the PSC Protocol provides as follows:
In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa the
Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely
with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also
cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies
in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.
Where necessary, recourse will be made to the [U.N.] to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support
for the [AU]’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of
peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the
provisions of Chapter VIII of the [U.N. Charter] on the role of
Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international
peace and security.91

These texts suggest that the AU is willing to assume the
primary role when it comes to the conflicts in Africa. Only
88. Protocol to Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the AU (“PSC
Protocol”) came into force on Dec. 26, 2003 after twenty-seven states of the
AU ratified it, and as of May 21, 2012, forty-seven out of fifty-four African
states have ratified the PSC Protocol. See List of Countries Which Have
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, AFRICAN UNION (July 13,
2012),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Peace%20and%20Security_0.pdf.
89. PSC Protocol art. 16.
90. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
91. PSC Protocol art. 17.
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when it is necessary, especially when the AU is in dire need of
financial support, the AU will consider the role of the Security
Council.92 African legal scholars justify this AU power by pointing to the Rwandan genocide, which “remains . . . ‘a deplorable
example of [the] international community’s disinterest in the
African continent,’”93 where “an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were
killed in Rwanda in 1994.”94 Professor Udombana pointed out
that “[t]ragically, the international community failed to forestall the genocide, despite the wide publicity given to it in the
world’s media, prior to and during the pogrom.”95 He maintained that, as a result, “Africa’s desire to take urgent actions
to stop massacres or serious fighting in the immediate future
may trump any commitment to cooperate with the [Security
Council].”96 Ben Kioko, the AU’s Legal Advisor, explained that
“when questions were raised as to whether the [AU] could possibly have an inherent right to intervene other than through
the Security Council, they were dismissed out of hand.”97 He
argued that this decision reflects a sense of frustration with the
slow pace of reform of the international community and the
92. See Kwesi Aning & Samuel Atuobi, Responsibility to Protect in Africa:
An Analysis of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture, 1 GLOBAL
RESP. PROTECT 90, 103–04 (2009) (“It is clear from the proactive interventionist language in both the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol that while the
[AU recognizes the Security Council’s] primacy in maintaining international
peace and security, . . . the AU has also reserved for itself an interventionist
role that reverts to the Security Council only when the AU deems necessary.”); see also Jeremy L. Levitt, The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case of Darfur, in
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY, REALITY—A NEED
FOR CHANGE? 213, 229–30 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005). Levitt
contends that read together, the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive
Act Articles 4(h) and (j) and the PSC Protocol Articles 4(j) and (k), 6(d), 7(c)–
(g), 16(1), and 17(1) and (2) “reveal that while the AU acknowledges the ‘primary’ role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and
security, particularly in Africa, it reserves the right to authorize intervention
in Africa, seeking UN involvement ‘where necessary.’” Id. (quoting PSC Protocol, supra note 45, arts. 17(1)–(2)).
93. See When Neutrality is a Sin, supra note 53, at 1175 (quoting Daniela
Kroslak, Book Review, 75 INT’L AFF. 877 (1999) (reviewing ARTHUR JAY
KLINGOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
(1998))).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1176.
97. See Kioko, supra note 8, at 821.
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tendency to focus attention on other parts of the world at the
expense of more pressing problems in Africa.98 In addition,
Ambassador Sam Ibok, the Director of the Peace and Security
Department of the AU, stated the following:
We [the AU] are not an arm of the United Nations. We accept
the UN’s global authority, but we will not wait for the UN to
authorize an action that we intend to take . . . . [W]e are in
tacit agreement with the [U.N.] on this and there is an understanding to that effect.99

These statements show the African community’s frustration
over the Security Council and the international community’s
past failures to act against the atrocities committed during
armed conflict in Africa. On the other hand, some scholars have
argued that the provisions of the Constitutive Act and the PSC
Protocol regarding the AU’s right to intervene violate Article
103 of the U.N. Charter.100
The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change
(“the Ezulwini Consensus”),101 which was adopted by the AU in
98. Id.
99. Interview by Ademola Abass with Ambassador Sam Ibok, (Feb. 2,
2004), in ADEMOLA ABASS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: BEYOND CHAPTER VIII OF THE UN CHARTER 166
(2004).
100. See David Wippman, Treaty-based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 620 (1995) (arguing that “[c]ritics of treaty-based intervention contend that any treaty purporting to authorize states to use force
against another state without its contemporaneous consent necessarily violates Article 2(4) and therefore also Article 103 . . . .”); see also Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 103, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
1117, 1122 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994). Bernard contends: “if the members of a regional arrangement . . . agree that in case of internal disturbances
or other events within one of the states concerned, the other state(s) can intervene with military forces without the consent of the de jure or de facto government, the compatibility of such a special agreement with the Charter becomes doubtful and must, in principle be denied. Here, the territorial integrity of all states and the prohibition of the use of force is at stake. An agreement permitting forceful intervention would hardly be compatible with the
Charter and would fall under Article 103.” Id. Art. 103 of the U.N. Charter
provides: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” U.N. Charter art. 103.
101. See Rep. of the High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec.
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2005, presents another perspective through “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the [U.N.]”102 It states
in clear terms the position of the AU on its relationship with
the Security Council on one hand, and Article 4(h) of the AU
Act vis-à-vis the U.N. Charter law on intervention on the other:
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of the conflicts and may not be in a
position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the
nature and development conflict situations, it is imperative
that Regional Organizations, in areas of proximity to conflicts
are empowered to take actions in this regard. The [AU] agrees
with the Panel that the intervention of Regional Organizations should be with the approval of the Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be granted
“after the fact” in circumstances requiring urgent action. In
such cases, the UN should assume responsibility for financing
such operations . . . .
With regard to the use of force, it is important to comply
scrupulously with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorize the use of force only in cases of legitimate self-defense. In addition, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, in its Article 4 (h), authorizes intervention in
grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Consequently, any recourse to force outside the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act should be prohibited.103

The AU’s position implies two things. First, it shows an insistence by the AU that “even if regional organizations may decide
to intervene . . . regional deliberations must take precedence
2004) (by Anand Panyarachun et al.). The Panel affirmed that “[t]here is a
growing recognition that the issue . . . [does not surround] ‘the right to intervene’ of any State, but the ‘responsibility to protect’”; every state bears this
right “when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe[s]—mass
murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, deliberate
starvation, and exposure to disease.” Id. ¶ 201. The Panel also recognized
that “while sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect
their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling
to do so, that responsibility should be taken by the wider international community . . . .” Id.
102. See AU, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the
United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus,” A.U. Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII)
(Mar. 7–8, 2005) [hereinafter The Ezulwini Consensus].
103. The Ezulwini Consensus, supra note 102, at 6.
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over global deliberations, even when relevant regional bodies
decide not to act or are incapable of acting effectively.”104 Second, this position implies that “until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security,”105 the AU is willing to take the primary responsibility without prior authorization from the Security Council.
For example, in the Darfur case, the AU played a primary role
in resolving the internal armed conflict.106 It is reported that
when discussing how best to respond to the crisis in Darfur,
especially in the event the Sudanese government continues fail,
the Security Council members from the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, Chile, and Spain referred to the AU as
“bearing the primary responsibility.”107 Francis Deng “argued
that since the Sudanese government had declared its hostility
to U.N. intervention, the best way forward was to encourage
the AU to establish a presence in Darfur with the Sudanese
government’s consent.”108 Although the AU’s regional mechanism was used to block collective action through the Security
Council, Deng’s viewpoint was “supported by . . . African states
primarily concerned with averting [unsolicited] international
intervention.”109 This episode reveals that the international
community has acknowledged and recognized that the AU has
taken the primary responsibility to deal with issues of peace
and security in the region.
104. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 80.
105. See U.N. Charter, art. 51.
106. See Suyash Paliwal, The Primacy of Regional Organizations in International Peacekeeping: The African Example, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 185, 198–201
(2010–2011).
107. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 79; see also S.C. Res. 1556, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004) (The Security Council “[e]ndorses the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force envisioned
by the African Union, to the Darfur region of Sudan under the leadership of
the African Union and urges the international community to support these
efforts . . . .”) (emphasis added).
108. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 79 (citing Rep. of the Secretary-General on
Internally Displaced Pers., Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses
and Displaced Persons, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶¶ 22, 26, 36, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/8 (Sept. 27, 2004) (by Francis M. Deng)).
109. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 79–80; see also AU, Decision on Darfur,
¶ 4, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.54(III) Rev.1 (July 6–8, 2004) (The Assembly
“[s]tress[ing] that the [AU] should continue to lead these efforts to address
the crisis in Darfur and that the International Community should continue to
support this efforts [sic].”).
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The relationship between the AU and the Security Council
remains speculative with regard to the AU’s right to intervene.
Nevertheless, as the recent history has shown, the AU has reserved for itself the primary responsibility to deal with war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, which threaten
peace and security in the African region.110 This is evident in
the codification of the right to intervene in the Constitutive Act
of the AU—the very instrument that created the AU.111 Additionally, the AU is in close proximity with the internal armed
conflicts in Africa. Thus, the AU has a greater claim than the
Security Council on the issues of international crimes that are
committed in the territory of the AU member states and that
threaten the regional peace and security.
B. The Institutional Organs of the AU Put in Place for the Exercise of the AU’s Right to Intervene
This section describes the institutional organs of the AU that
are structured toward realizing the AU’s duty to intervene.
Several new organs were established112 to enable the AU to
meet these new objectives and to strengthen what others have
termed a “very ambitious experiment based on the [European
Union] model.”113 The description of the organs of the AU will
show that the AU as a whole has been structured toward intervention.
Consistent with the sovereign equality principle, the annual
Assembly of Heads of State and Government (“AU Assembly”)
is the supreme organ that debates and decides issues, and
adopts resolutions, just as it had under the OAU.114 It is this
110. Constitutive Act art. 4(h), (j).
111. Art. 2 of the Constitutive Act states that “[t]he [AU] is hereby established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Constitutive Act art. 2;
see also Bryan D. Kreykes, Toward a Model of Humanitarian Intervention:
The Legality of Armed Intervention to Address Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 335, 346 (2010).
112. See Constitutive Act art. 5 (listing the organs of the AU).
113. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 6, at 205.
114. See Constitutive Act art. 6; see also OAU Charter art. 8. Article 8 of the
OAU Charter states that “[t]he [OAU Assembly] shall be the supreme organ
of the Organization. It shall, subject to the provision of this Charter, discuss
matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition review the
structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies
which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.” Id.
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body that must approve calls for AU intervention and give directions to the relevant organs established to deal with peace
and security in Africa. To implement its decisions, the Constitutive Act allows the AU Assembly to delegate its powers to
any of its organs115 and to establish any other organs not listed
in the Constitutive Act.116 It is on this basis that the PSC117
was established. The PSC is required to work with many organs within the AU, which are in turn designed to support the
PSC in playing its role of preventing conflicts and international
crimes. These are organs are discussed below in this section.
The PSC is the primary decision-making organ established to
prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa.118 Its “collective security and early-warning arrangements facilitate [a]
timely and efficient response to conflict” situations.119 The AU
Assembly established the PSC because of the concerns “that
conflicts have forced millions of our people, including women
and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internal displaced persons, deprived of their means and livelihood, human
dignity and hope.”120 Therefore, the PSC Protocol gives broad
powers to the PSC in comparison to the Central Organ of the
OAU,121 which was the predecessor of the PSC.122 These powers
include making recommendations to the AU Assembly “pursuant to article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, and intervention on
behalf of the [AU], in a Member State in respect of grave cir115. See Constitutive Act art. 9(2).
116. Id. art. 5(2).
117. The PSC Protocol is rooted in Art. 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act and
determines that the PSC shall be “a collective security and early warning
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict situation in
Africa.” PSC Protocol art. 2(1). The PSC is therefore the primary organ of the
AU tasked with conflict resolution and prevention on the continent. See id;
see also Hennie Strydom, Peace and Security under the African Union, 28 S.
AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 59, 62 (2003).
118. PSC Protocol art. 2(1).
119. Id. See Strydom, supra note 117, at 62.
120. PSC Protocol pmbl.
121. See PSC Protocol art. 3 (listing the objectives of the PSC). The Central
Organ was established by the OAU Declaration on a Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution (“Cairo Declaration”). See OAU,
Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, ¶ 17, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX) (June 28-30,
1993).
122. PSC Protocol pmbl.
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cumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity as defined in international conventions and instruments.”123 The AU Assembly recognizes that the “observance of
human rights” and “the rule of law” are essential for the prevention of conflicts.124 In achieving its objectives, the PSC seeks
guidance from the Constitutive Act, the U.N. Charter, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.125 The PSC Protocol
also gives the PSC a wide variety of functions in a wide range
of areas, including the promotion of peace and stability in Africa and intervention pursuant to the Constitutive Act.126
The PSC acts on behalf of the AU member states that are
parties to the PSC Protocol.127 The PSC is composed of fifteen
members, ten of which are elected for a term of two years,
while the remaining five members are elected for a term of
three years.128 The members are elected by the Assembly according to specifically defined criteria.129 The criteria consider
moral obligations, which include the history of a particular
state in curtailing the effects of conflict on the continent, the
states’ own histories that relate to peace and security, and the
commitment to the principles of the AU, as contained in the
Constitutive Act.130
Another organ instrumental in the exercise of the AU’s right
to intervene is the Panel of the Wise, which was established to
support and to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU
Commission in their efforts in the areas of conflict prevention
and in “the promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and
stability in Africa.”131 The Panel of the Wise is composed of
“five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to
the cause of peace, security and development on the conti-

123. See id. art. 7(e).
124. See id. at 3.
125. See id. art. 4.
126. Id. art. 6.
127. See id. art. 7(2).
128. Id. art. 5(1).
129. Id. art. 5(2).
130. See id. art. 5(2)(a)–(e).
131. See id. art. 11(3); see also Ademola Jegede, The African Union Peace
and Security Architecture: Can the Panel of the Wise Make a Difference?, 9
AFT. HUM. RTS. L.J. 409, 409 (2009) (examining the necessity to have the
Panel of the Wise in the AU peace and security architecture).
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nent.”132 “The Panel meets as often as the circumstances may
require, or at least three times a year.”133 It “may also sit at
any time at the request of the [PSC] or [of] the Chairperson of
the [AU] Commission.”134 One scholar has correctly argued that
“such impromptu sittings” are appropriate, “considering the
spontaneous nature of conflicts” that arise in Africa.135
The PSC Protocol also mandates the Chairperson of the AU
Commission to bring to the attention of the PSC any matter
that “may threaten peace, security, and stability in the continent.”136 The AU Commission is the secretariat of the AU
whose structures, functions, and regulations are determined by
the AU Assembly.137 It is composed of the Chairperson, the
deputy to the Chairperson, and various commissioners.138 The
AU Assembly has decided that the AU Commission must be
transformed into the AU Authority “to strengthen the institutional framework of the AU and to accelerate the economic and
political integration of the continent.”139 This transformation is
yet to come because the AU Assembly must still decide on the
progress made by the AU Commission in dealing with this matter so far.140 To this end, the Chairperson of the Commission
may use his or her office to “prevent potential conflicts.”141
The Chairperson of the Commission also works closely with
the Panel of the Wise and the regional mechanisms to prevent
conflicts.142 The role of the Chairperson of the AU Commission
with regard to peace and security matters is defined in the PSC
Protocol.143 In this regard, the Chairperson of the AU Commission is required to “take all initiatives deemed appropriate to
132. PSC Protocol art. 11(2).
133. See Jegede, supra note 131, at 419; see also PSC Protocl art. 11(6).
134. See Jegede, supra note 131, at 419; see also PSC Protocol art. 11(4).
135. See Jegede, supra note 131, at 419.
136. PSC Protocol art. 10(2)(a).
137. Constitutive Act art. 20.
138. Id. art. 20(2).
139. AU, Decision on the Transformation of the AU Commission into the AU
Authority, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.341 (XVI) (Jan. 30–31, 2011).
140. AU, Decision on the Transformation of the AU Commission into the AU
Authority, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.372 (XVII) (Jun. 30–July 1, 2011)
(the AU Assembly deciding to defer the consideration of the said item to the
next ordinary session in early 2012).
141. PSC Protocol art. 10(2)(c).
142. Id.
143. See id. arts. 7, 10.
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prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts” under the authority of
the PSC and in consultation with all the parties involved.144
Additionally, the Chairperson may bring to the Panel of the
Wise any matter he or she deems that deserve the attention of
the Panel.145 The Chairperson’s function regarding matters of
peace and security also includes implementing and following
up on the decisions of the PSC and those decisions taken by the
AU Assembly in terms of Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.146
The PSC Protocol also established the Continental Early
Warning System (“Early Warning System”) to “facilitate the
anticipation and prevention of conflicts.”147 The Early Warning
System includes “the Situation Room,” which is “responsible for
data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicator module” and for the “observation and
monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the
Situation Room . . . .148 The Chairperson of the Commission is
expected to use “the information gathered through the Early
Warning System timeously to advise the [PSC] on potential
conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and [to]
recommend the best course of action.”149
C. The Impediments That May Bar the AU from Exercising the
Right to Intervene
The AU functions on the basis of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference, and intervention may not occur
as easily as it sounds on paper. In this regard, a collective decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of the
AU is required for an intervention.150 To ascertain the challenges faced by the AU in the exercise of its right to intervene,
one must examine the relevant decisions and resolution adopted by the AU Assembly since the AU’s inception. At the same
time, these resolutions and decisions also show the positions
that the AU has taken to date when it comes to internal con144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. art. 10(1).
Id. art. 10(2)(b).
Id. art. 10(3).
Id. art. 12(1).
Id. art. 12(2).
Id. art. 12(5).
See Constitutive Act art. 7(1).
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flicts in Africa. It must be recalled that the AU was established
with a view to eradicate all forms of human rights violations as
the African leaders recognized that there can be no peace without ensuring that human rights are protected.151
From this examination of the AU resolutions and decisions,
the following observations can be made: First, the AU Assembly does not tolerate internal conflicts arising from unconstitutional changes of governments. This is reflected in the AU Assembly decision concerning Chad, where the AU Assembly “recall[ed] its rejection of any unconstitutional change in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of
the [AU] . . . and stress[ed] that no authority that comes to
power by force will be recognized by the AU.”152 As a result, the
AU Assembly “[s]trongly condemn[ed] the attacks perpetrated
by armed groups against the Chadian government and demand[ed] an immediate end to [the] attacks . . . resulting [in]
bloodshed.”153 The language used here by the AU Assembly is
clear and leaves no doubt in the minds of the parties involved
as to its position.154 The AU may even issue sanctions against a
state that does not abide by the decisions and principles of the
AU. For example, sanctions were passed on the Ivory Coast
during the dispute over the results of the November 2010 presidential elections.155 Consequently, the Ivory Coast was suspended from participation in the activities of the AU “until
such a time the democratically elected President effectively assumes State Power.”156 Further, although the language was not
151. See id. at 35 (stating that the OAU Heads of State and Government
were “[c]onscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes
a major impediment to the . . . need to promote peace, security and stability .
. . .”).
152. See AU, Decision on the Situation in Chad, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.188 (X) (Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 2008).
153. Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
154. See AU, Decision on the Report of the Peace and Sec. Council on its Activities and on the State of Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 9, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.252 (XIII) (July 3, 2009) (supporting the decisions of the PSC
on the unconstitutional changes that occurred in Mauritania, Guinea, and
Madagascar).
155. Peace and Sec. Council of the AU (PSC), Communiqué of the 252d
Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, ¶ 4, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.1
(CCLII) (Dec. 9, 2010).
156. Id. This PSC decision was endorsed by the AU Assembly. See AU, Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the
State of Peace and Sec. in Africa, ¶ 22, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.338 (XVI)
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as strong as in the situations in Chad and Ivory Coast, the AU
Assembly did stress “the need for those involved in [human
rights] violations to be held accountable” following the violence
caused by the dispute of the presidential elections results in
Kenya.157
Second, the decisions adopted by the AU Assembly also
demonstrate that the heads of state still have not relinquished
their fear of criticizing each other, and that their reaction depends on a state involved in particular conflicts and also on the
nature of the conflict.158 This is evident in the crisis in Sudan
and the way the AU handled the situation.159 The language
used in the decisions of the AU Assembly pertaining to the crisis in Darfur is lax compared to that of the decisions stated for
the situations in Chad and Ivory Coast.160 Here, the AU Assembly “[r]eiterat[ed] its serious concern over the prevailing
situation in the Darfur Region”161 and “welcome[d] the
measures taken by the [Government of Sudan] to protect the
civilian populations, facilitate the work of the humanitarian
agencies and NGOs and provide them with unrestricted access
(Jan. 31, 2011). The AU Assembly made the following decision with regard to
the situation in Ivory Coast: The AU Assembly “[expresses] its deep concern
at the prevailing crisis in Cote d’Ivoire following the 2nd round of the presidential elections held on 28 November 2010, [endorses] the PSC Communiqués and [commends] ECOWAS, the AU Commission and all the African and
international leaders involved in the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Assembly [encourages] the AU Commission and ECOWAS to continue with their efforts to find, as soon as possible, a solution that respects democracy and the will of the people as expressed on 28 November 2010 and
preserves peace in the country.” Id.
157. AU, Decision on the Situation in Kenya Following the Presidential
Election of Dec. 27, 2007, ¶¶ 3, 5, Assembly/AU/Dec.187 (X) (Jan. 31–Feb. 2,
2008) (where the AU Assembly “strongly urg[ed] the parties to commit themselves to a peaceful dialogue in conformity with the rule of law”) (emphasis
added).
158. See AU, Decision on Darfur, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.54 (III)
(July 6–8, 2004) (noting that “even though the humanitarian situation in
Darfur is serious, it cannot be defined as genocide”) [hereinafter Decision on
Darfur].
159. Id.
160. See notes 156 and 157 supra, where the language used by the AU Assembly against Chad is strong as compared to the language used against Sudan. The inference therefore is that because the Chad situation involved an
armed group against the government as compared to the situation in Sudan
where it is the government of Sudan at the forefront of the conflict. Id.
161. Decision on Darfur, supra note 158, ¶ 1.
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to the affected populations.”162 This is in contrast with reports
that the Sudanese government did not want to cooperate and
that it was one of the parties that targeted civilians in this conflict.163 While the AU sent the AU Mission in Darfur164 to participate in peacekeeping, it avoided criticizing President Al
Bashir or the way he dealt with the conflict as the leader.165
Third, when the international community has intervened on
African issues to protect the nationals, the AU has shown dissatisfaction. For example, when the ICC issued arrest warrants
against President Al Bashir, the AU Assembly adopted several
decisions requesting that AU member states should not cooperate with the ICC.166 The AU even went as far as examining the
162. Id. ¶ 3.
163. On the history of Darfur, see JULIE FLINT & ALEXANDER DE WAAL,
DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 112 (2005) (noting that when U.N.
agencies attempted to intervene, the Khartoum government obstructed outside investigation and blocked relief efforts); see also Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n
of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60
(Jan. 25, 2005) (by Antonio Cassesse et al.).
164. “In 2006, the AU deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan, which
was replaced in 2008 by the unprecedented joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (“UNAMID”), currently the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.” UNAMID Background, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml (last
visited Oct. 27, 2012). UNAMID’s mandate has been extended since then,
most recently until July 31, 2012, and currently stands at 92 percent of its
authorized troop strength of almost 20,000. See UNAMID Facts and Figures,
NATIONS,
UNITED
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012).
165. There is no resolution or decision of the AU criticizing Sudan’s handling of the situation.
166. See AU, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal
Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of
the Sudan, ¶¶ 1, 5, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 221 (XII) (Feb. 1–3, 2009)
(requesting “the Commission to convene a meeting of the African States that
are parties to the Rome Statute . . . to exchange views on the work of the ICC
in relation to Africa, in particular, in light of the processes initiated against
African personalities, and to submit recommendations thereon taking into
account all relevant elements”); AU, Decision on the Meeting of African States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, ¶ 10, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.245
(XIII) (July 1–3, 2009) (deciding not to cooperate with the ICC in the execution of the arrest warrant issued against Al Bashir of Sudan); AU, Decision
on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court,
¶¶ 4, 5, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.334 (XVI) (Jan. 30–31, 2011), (regretting
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possibility of the AfCHPR having the jurisdiction to deal with
international crimes.167 This is significant because the AU Assembly has never taken any adverse decisions against the
member states that referred the situations to the ICC to prosecute the opposition parties.168 It is therefore questionable that
the AU would claim that the ICC is targeting Africans.169 This
is also reflected by the AU Assembly’s decision to target the
Lord’s Resistance Army, which is alleged to have committed
atrocities in the Great Lakes Region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), the Central African Republic,
and Southern Sudan.170 This decision should be commended for
“the Decisions . . . of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC . . . informing the
U.N. Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties of the Rome
Statute (ASP) about the visit of President [Al Bashir] to [Chad and Kenya] . .
.” and deciding that “by receiving President Bashir, [Chad and Kenya] were
implementing various AU Assembly Decisions on the warrant of arrest issued
by the ICC against President Bashir as well as acting in pursuit of peace and
stability in their respective regions”); AU, Decision on the Implementations of
the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/670
(XIX), ¶ 6, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 366 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011).
(noting “that the warrant of arrest . . . seriously complicates the efforts aimed
at finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis in Libya” and deciding
that member states “shall not cooperate in the execution of the arrest warrant”); AU, Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, ¶ 7, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.419 (XIX) (July 15–
16, 2012) (encouraging the African State Parties to the Rome Statute and
African non-state parties “to consider concluding bilateral agreements on the
immunities of their Senior State officials”).
167. See AU, Decision on the Implementations of the Assembly Decisions on
the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/670 (XIX), ¶ 8, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 366 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011).
168. There are no decisions or resolutions adopted by the AU that condemn
the DRC and Uganda for referring the situations in their respective territories to the ICC for investigations and prosecutions.
169. For further discussion on whether the ICC is targeting Africans, see
Ntombizozuko Dyani, Is the International Criminal Court Targeting Africa?
Reflections on the Enforcement of International Criminal Law in Africa, in
AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 185 (Vincent
Nmehielle ed., 2012).
170. See Annex II to Letter Dated Sept. 15, 2009 from the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, Plan of Action, ¶ 8(ix), U.N. Doc. S/2009/461 (Sept.
15, 2009) (by Lila Hanitra Ratsifandrihamanana) (renewing “efforts . . . to
neutralize the [LRA] and [to] bring to an end its atrocities and destabilizing
atrocities in the [Democratic Republic of Congo], Southern Sudan, and Central African Republic”); see also AU, Decision on the Report of the Peace and
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dealing with human rights atrocities that include the use of
child soldiers and sexual slavery, even if the motivation remains questionable due to its exclusive focus on crimes committed by the opposition group. Therefore, although the AU
still adheres to the principles of non-interference, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity with regard to its leaders—”brother
leaders,”171 depending on the situation—it still passes resolutions to condemn human rights violations. Moreover, the AU
has, in some instances, intervened in the territory of some
member states even though the intervention was not based on
the right to intervene as contemplated in the Constitutive
Act.172
III. THE AU INTERVENTIONS
The AU has not conducted extensive interventions on the
continent despite the significant need for intervention. Nevertheless, it has intervened in Burundi to build peace, intervened
in Darfur to enable the establishment of a more robust U.N.
peace operation and to monitor the humanitarian crisis effectively, and intervened in Somalia to coordinate efforts to advance the cause of peace.173 Although these interventions are
evidence of the AU’s ambition to handle issues that threaten
peace and security, and to halt gross human rights violations in
the continent, the AU is faced with challenges that include lack
of funds and an unwillingness of states to deploy troops in areas that are deemed too dangerous.174 Further, the interventions
are exercised with the state’s consent as opposed to the right to
intervene without state consent.175

Security Council on Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 21, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 369 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011) (welcoming the initiatives taken by the AU Commission on the issue of the LRA,
and requesting the AU Council to give early authorization for the envisaged
operation against the LRA).
171. This term is used by the AU Assembly to refer to the late Colonel Gaddafi, and the same term was also used during the OAU era to refer to the
African heads of state.
172. See infra Part IV.
173. See infra Part IV.A–C.
174. See infra Part IV.A–C.
175. See Lieblich, supra note 1, at 370–71 (arguing that the AU exercises its
right to intervene in terms of Art. 4(h) of the Constitutive Act against the will
of its member states).
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A. AU Mission in Burundi
Like its neighboring state Rwanda, Burundi has a population
made up of Hutus (85%) and Tutsis (14%), and the power
struggle between these groups of people has been the same
since the country’s independence.176 The current conflict in Burundi began in the latter half of 1993, when President Melchior
Ndadaye, a Hutu, was assassinated by “soldiers from the Tutsidominated government army.”177 Mediation initiatives by former presidents Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Nelson Mandela
(South Africa) resulted in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi,178 which was signed by the parties involved, including the Burundi government and representatives
of the principal Hutu and Tutsi political parties.179 The agreement provided for power sharing and for a transitional period
of thirty-six months, during which national assembly and presidential elections were to take place.180 Ceasefire agreements
were signed between the transition government of Burundi and
two Hutu rebel groups.181 However, despite the progress that
had been made, one rebel group refused to engage in the peace
process and continued its attacks against government forces.182
During this time, the PSC was not yet operational.183 As a result, the OAU Central Organ approved the deployment of the
176. See Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and
Participation in Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 49, 51, 65 (1995).
177. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 44–45; see Tim Murithi, The African Union’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and The African Union Mission in
Somalia, 17 AFR. SECURITY REV. 70 (2008).
178. See Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, at 2,
Aug.
28,
2000,
available
at
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/Burundi/arusha.pdf [hereinafter Arusha
Agreement].
179. Id. at 1.
180. Arusha Agreement, supra note 178, Protocol II, art. 13.
181. Stef Vandeginste, Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi:
Twenty Years of Trial and Error, 3 AFRICA SPECTRUM 63, 72 (2009).
182. Cent. Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Mgmt. and
Resolution at Heads of State and Gov’t Level, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 1, A.U.
Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AHG/Comm. (VII) (Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter AU
Conflict Prevention VII].
183. The PSC was inaugurated in 2004. See U.N. Secretary-General’s, Secretary-General’s Message to the Inauguration of the Peace and Security
Council
of
the
African
Union
(May
25,
2004),
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=943 (congratulating “the
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African Mission in Burundi (“AMIB”) to support its peace process on February 3, 2003.184 AMIB “was the first operation
wholly initiated, planned, and executed by the AU.”185 One of
AMIB’s tasks was to protect returning politicians who would
take part in the transitional government.186 AMIB was also involved in creating conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees living in the eight Burundian
provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania to return to
their homes.187 The objectives of the mission also included overseeing the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements and
implementing conditions that would be favorable for the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission.188 South Africa,
Mozambique, and Ethiopia pledged to send their troops for
AMIB,189 with South Africa as the Lead Nation.190
It is argued that despite challenges faced by AMIB during its
operation, it eventually “succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation, which would likely have escalated to a violent conflict in its absence.”191 It is in this regard that “AMIB
showed that the AU could play a significant role in stabilizing
situations on the ground prior to U.N. deployment.”192 But, despite its relative success, AMIB faced financial constraints in
its mission.193 As a result, the AU “decided that troopcontributing [states] would be responsible for the first two
months of deployment, pending AU reimbursement, with the
AU assuming the financial responsibility at the end of this period.”194 Thus, during the launch of the mission, only South Af-

members of the African Union on this historic day,” which marked the inauguration of the PSC).
184. AU Conflict Prevention VII, supra note 182, ¶ 2.
185. Murithi, supra note 177, 75.
186. See Cent. Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Mgmt. and
Resolution at Heads of State and Gov’t Level, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 5(iii), A.U.
Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XCI) (Apr. 2, 2003).
187. Id.
188. Id. ¶ 5(ii).
189. Id. ¶ 3.
190. Id. ¶ 2.
191. Murithi supra note 177, 75.
192. Id.
193. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. S/2004/210 (Mar. 16, 2004); see also Omorogbe, supra
note 23, at 46.
194. Id.
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rica was deployed in Burundi even though Ethiopia and
Mozambique had also given their commitment to send their
troops.195 It was only after the United States and the United
Kingdom contributed funds to Ethiopia and Mozambique that
they were able to deploy their forces.196
AMIB fulfilled “its primary objective” in March 2004.197 The
Security Council authorized the deployment of the U.N. Operation in Burundi (“ONUB”) in May 2004.198 The former AMIB
troops were also incorporated into ONUB,199 and “[d]uring the
mission, the Burundi government’s transitional process was
successfully concluded in September 2005, after democratic
elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency, and
[also] after the installation of a government in line with the
power-sharing agreements outlined in the Arusha Agreement.”200 By December 2006, ONUB had completed its mission.201
B. AU Mission in Darfur
It is argued that the armed conflict in Darfur became the
“AU’s most significant test to date.”202 Following the escalation
of the armed conflict, the Chadian government mediated between the Sudanese government and the two rebel groups: Sudan Liberation Movement (“SLM”) and Justice and Equality
Movement (“JEM”). The mediation process led to the signing of
a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (“N’djamena Agreement”) in April 2004 between the Sudanese government, the
SLM, and the JEM.203 The N’djamena Agreement provided for,
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Id. at 47 (“In March 2004, the PSC stated that AMIB had fulfilled
its primary objective—the creation of a ‘conducive environment’ for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission—and requested the UN to take
over.”); see also Murithi supra note 177, 75 (“AMIB’s crucial role in this case
was to create conditions through which peace, albeit fragile, could be built in
the country. By the end of its mission AMIB had succeeded in establishing
relative peace to most provinces in Burundi . . . .”).
198. S.C. Res. 1545, ¶¶ 2, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004).
199. See Murithi, supra note 177, 76.
200. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 47.
201. Id.
202. Murithi, supra note 177, 76.
203. See AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation
in Sudan (Crisis in Darfur), ¶ 18, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/2(V) (Apr. 13, 2004); see
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among other provisions, the establishment of a Ceasefire
Commission composed of two high-ranking officers from the
parties, the Chadian mediation, and the involvement of the international community in the mediation process.204
On May 28, 2004, under the backing of the AU, the parties
concluded an “Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur.”205 In short, this agreement held that in order to implement the provisions in the N’Djamena Agreement,
an AU Monitoring Mission composed of observers from the parties, the Chadian mediation, AU member states, and other representatives of the International Community would be the operational arm of the Ceasefire Commission.206 This resulted in
AU’s decision to establish an AU Observer Mission (“AMIS I”),
the purpose of which was to protect civilian population and to
monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.207 The U.N.
Security Council gave its support to the AU’s active and lead
role in Darfur and to the deployment of AU monitors, including
a protection force.208 The government of Sudan, “the SLM and
the JEM also signed the Abuja Protocol on Humanitarian and
Security Issues” (“Abuja Protocols”) on November 9, 2004.209 In
also Robert P. Barnidge Jr., The United Nations and the African Union: Assessing a Partnership for Peace in Darfur, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 93
(2009); Omorogbe, supra note 22; Marten Zwanenburg, Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Three Recent
Regional African Peace Operations, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 483, 494
(2006).
204. Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur art. 3,
Apr.
8,
2004,
available
at
http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=14149.
205. See AU, Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the
Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur, May 28,
2004,
available
at
http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/sudan/darfur/cfc/agreement.pdf.
206. Id. § II(4).
207. PSC, AU, Communiqué of the Solemn Launching of the Peace and Sec.
Council, § A(6), A.U. Doc. PSC/AHG/Comm. (X) (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter
PSC Communiqué X].
208. See S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 107, ¶ 2.
209. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; see Protocol Between the Government
of the Sudan (Gos), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the
Justice Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Humanitarian
Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N’Djamena Agreement, Nov. 9,
2004,
available
at
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the Protocols, “the parties requested the ‘AU to urgently take
the necessary steps to strengthen AMIS I on the ground, with
the requisite mandate to ensure more effective monitoring of
the commitments . . . .’”210
On May 25, 2004, the PSC approved AMIS I,211 and
“[i]nitially, AMIS I had sixty military observers (“MILOBs”)
and 300 MILOB protectors.”212 Commentators have observed
that the small size of AMIS I was insufficient because it failed
to provide the “full coverage of the Darfur region,” resulting in
“ceasefire violations on all sides” and the deterioration of the
security situation.213 In response, the PSC decided to create an
enhanced mission, which became known as AMIS II. At this
time, AMIS II’s mandate and resources were strengthened
from those of its predecessor, and the PSC expanded the size of
AMIS II.214 The Security Council also supported the increased
mandate of AMIS II.215 In addition to monitoring compliance
with ceasefire agreements, AMIS II was mandated “to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian
relief and . . . the return of [internally displaced persons] and
refugees to their homes . . . .”216 Further, AMIS II could
“[p]rotect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat
and in the immediate vicinity . . . .”217
Despite the commendable changes made to the AMIS II,
commentators have noted that the AU’s lack of resources prevented the AMIS II from effectively carrying out its reinforced
mandate.218 Because of the challenges arising from the lack of
http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=14152 [hereinafter Protocol of Sudan].
210. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49 (quoting Protocol of Sudan, supra note
214).
211. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; see PSC Communiqué X, supra note
208, § A(6).
212. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; see AU, Briefing Note on the Renewal
of the Mandate of the AU Mission in The Sudan (AMIS), ¶ 4, A.U. Doc.
PSC/PR/2 (XLII) (Oct. 20, 2005).
213. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; Zwanenburg, supra note 203, at 495.
214. See PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 7, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII) (Oct.
20, 2004) [hereinafter PSC Communiqué XVII]; see also PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 9, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XXVIII) (Apr. 28, 2005).
215. S.C. Res. 1574, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1574 (Nov. 19 2004).
216. PSC Communiqué XVII, supra note 214, ¶ 4.
217. Id. ¶ 6.
218. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49, 53; Zwanenburg, supra note 203,
at 495.
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resources in early 2006, the PSC agreed to a transition from an
AU to a U.N. force.219 This led to a number of resolutions that
established the AU/U.N. hybrid operation in Darfur
(“UNAMID”) as a joint peace support mission with a mandate
to protect civilians derived from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.220 UNAMID assumed the mandate from AMIS II on December 31, 2007.221 This meant that the U.N. also assumed financial responsibility for the cost of AMIS forces, operating
now under the single command of the U.N.222 There are differing opinions about the effectiveness of AU and U.N. efforts
through UNAMID.223 One commentator has noted that the situation in Darfur will ultimately depend on the ability of the
parties to reach a political settlement.224 UNAMID was extended for one year until July 31, 2012, while welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General and the AU to review the number
uniformed personnel required for effectiveness.225 The Security

219. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 50 (noting that the PSC supported the
transition to a U.N. force as a result of “uncertainties regarding the financial
stability” in the AU); see also, PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶¶ 2–5, A.U. Doc.
PSC/PR/Comm. (XLV) (Jan. 12, 2006); PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶¶ 5–6, A.U.
Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm. (XLVI) (Mar. 10, 2006).
220. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 51; see also, PSC, AU, Communiqué
on the Situation in Darfur, ¶ 8, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXIX) (June 22,
2007); see also S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
221. G.A. Res. 62/232A, ¶¶ 43–44, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/232A (Dec. 22,
2007).
222. Id; S.C. Res. 1769, supra note 220, ¶¶ 6–8. For a discussion of the cost
of the UNAMID resources, see Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 51–52.
223. See Murithi, supra note 177, 79 (questioning this “new relationship”
between the UN and the AU in this regard (UNAMID), arguing that “[i]t is
too early to pass a definitive judgment on this emerging hybrid partnership,”
and noting that “[t]he AU has to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not
descend into a relationship of hybrid paternalism”); Tom Kabau, The Responsibility to Protect and the Role of Regional Organizations: An Appraisal of the
African Union’s Interventions, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 49, 67 (2012) (arguing
that UNAMID “was more than a larger peacekeeping force, and not a robust
enforcement force despite previous unsuccessful peacekeeping, continued civil
war and mass atrocities”). Kabau attributes this to the fact that both the AU
and the U.N. focused “on Sudan to consent to the deployment of troops and
military equipment . . . .” Id. at 68. This was done despite the resolutions of
the Security Council passed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that permitted enforcement action (which did not sought consent from Sudan). Id.
224. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 53.
225. S.C. Res. 2003, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2003 (July 29, 2011).
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Council has now decided to extend the UNAMID mandate “for
a further 12 months” to July 31, 2013.226
C. AU Mission in Somalia
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, various attempts have been made by both regional and international actors to find ways to resolve the armed conflict in Somalia.227
Mark Malan, writing in the late 1990s, noted that prior international interventions in Somalia failed to produce desired results and have instead created reluctance on the part of the
U.N. and the international community to become involved in
African conflicts generally.228 This is due to the fact that international efforts have proven to be counterproductive because of
the continuous instability in Somalia.229 In 2002, the Somali
National Reconciliation Process took place “under the patronage of . . . Inter-Governmental Authority on Development”
(“IGAD”) with the support of the U.N., AU, European Union
(“EU”), and United States.230 This process is argued to have
been successful since over twenty major Somali stakeholders
signed “a statement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the
Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconcilia226. S.C. Res. 2063, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2063 (July 31, 2012).
227. See Peter Pham, Somalia: Where a State Isn’t a State, 35 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 133, 137 (2011) ( “Since the fall of President Siyad Barre and the
coterminous collapse of the Somali state in 1991, regional and international
actors have tried repeatedly to find ways to resolve the armed conflict in Somalia by sponsoring extensive international peace processes, with the intention of instituting a functioning government in Mogadishu, Somalia.”). Pham
also discusses the role played by the sub-regional organization InterGovernmental Authority on Development (“IGAD”) supported by the European Union and the United States in an attempt to solve the Somali conflict.
Id.; see also, Mark Malan, The Crisis in External Response, in PEACE, PROFIT
OR PLUNDER: THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY IN WAR-TORN AFRICAN SOCIETIES
37, 42–43 (Jakkie Cilliers & Peggy Mason eds., 1999) (discussing various international responses to the Somali situation since 1991).
228. See Malan, supra note 227, at 43 (describing the events that occurred
in Somalia, including the “humiliating scenes” of the bodies of the US soldiers
being subjected to public acts of outrage, and arguing that “Somalia was thus
a turning point at which international community lost all desire to experiment further with ‘middle ground’ operations in Africa”).
229. See Pham, supra note 227, at 133–41 (discussing the reasons for Somalia’s failure to find peace).
230. See Id. at 137; see also Omorogbe supra note 23, at 54 (describing the
“Somalia National Reconciliation Process” that took place under IGAD).
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tion Process on October 27, 2002.”231 This led to the adoption of
a Transitional Federal Charter by the Transitional Federal
Government (“TFG”) in February 2004.232
While the TFG had found international acclaim, it found it
difficult to operate within Mogadishu.233 The TFG was therefore “provisionally located in Baidoa, 250 kilometers northwest
of Mogadishu.”234 The TFG lost its control of Somalia to the Union of Islamic Courts (“UIC”), 235 and “[i]n June 2006, the UIC
seized control of Mogadishu, and began to extend its authority
over a large part of Southern Somalia.”236 Also during that
month, the UIC established the “Supreme Council of Islamic
[C]ourts, with an executive and legislative authority.”237 TFG
and UIC agreed to engage in dialogue, but armed conflict resumed the following month, resulting in the UIC’s capture of
parts of TFG’s areas of control.238 By September 2006, the UIC
had also taken control of Kismayo, the largest city in the
southern region of Somalia. 239
The TFG received support from Ethiopia,240 while UIC also
enjoyed foreign support.241 The intensification of the armed
conflict in 2006 and the participation of foreign actors increased the risk of a broader regional armed conflict.242 This led
231. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 54; see also Declaration on Cessation
of Hostilities, and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation
Process,
Oct.
27,
2002,
available
at
http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/somaliadeclaration.
pdf.
232. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 54.
233. Benjamin R. Farley, Calling a State: Somaliland and International
Recognition, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 777, 784–85 (2010) (noting that the TFG
had never entered Mogadishu, instead it operated in Kenya for several
months).
234. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55.
235. Pham, supra note 227, at 138
236. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55; see Pham, supra note 227, at 138.
237. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55.
238. See id.
239. November 2006 Monthly Forecast of Somalia, SECURITY COUNCIL
REPORT (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthlyforecast/2006-11/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_2193657.php.
240. Colin Warbrick & Zeray W. Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action Against
the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications,
56 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 666, 667 (2007).
241. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary General on the Situation
in Som., ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2007/115 (Feb. 28, 2007).
242. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.
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to the Security Council establishing the IGAD Mission in Somalia (“IGASOM”).243 According to Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, the
IGASOM project was overtaken by events of December 20,
2006 when a conflict broke out again between the TFG, assisted by Ethiopian troops, and the UIC.244 Omorogbe also stated
that “[a]lthough the TFG and Ethiopian troops forced the UIC
to retreat, the TFG was not able to institute an effective authority” in Somalia.245 The TFG’s reliance on the presence of
Ethiopian forces raised issues regarding its legitimacy in the
eyes of the civilian population and their endorsement of the
UIC.246 In addition, the UIC still posed a serious threat to TFG
through Shabaab, its well-armed and well-trained elite force.247
The African Union Mission in Somalia (“AMISOM”) was
eventually authorized by the PSC with the aim to support the
TFG.248 The AMISOM’s mandate included support to the TFG
institutions and the facilitation of the provisions of humanitarian assistance to create conditions conducive for the long-term
stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia.249 The AMISOM
received support from the Security Council.250 The Security
Council provided AMISOM with a mandate under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter “to take all necessary measures as appro243. S.C. Res. 1725, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1725 (Dec. 6, 2006). (The Security Council “[d]etermin[ed] that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat
to international peace and security in the region,” and “authorize[d] IGAD
and [AU] [m]ember [s]tates to establish a protection and training mission in
Somalia.”). Id. ¶ 3.
244. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55–56.
245. Id. at 55.
246. Id. at 55–56.
247. See Monitoring Group on Somalia, Rep. of the Monitoring Group on
Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1724 (2006), ¶¶ 23–27, 35–
38, U.N. Doc. S/2007/436 (July 18, 2007) (by Bruno Schiemksy et al.); see also
Warbrick & Yihdego, supra note 240, at 667, 670.
248. See Background and Political Developments, African Union Mission in
UNION
COMMISSION,
http://www.africaSomalia,
AFRICAN
union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_Background.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012); see also PSC, AU, Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Sec. Council, ¶ 8, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX) (Jan.
19, 2007).
249. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.
250. S.C. Res. 1744, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (Feb. 21, 2007) (The Security Council decided to “authorize member States of the [AU] to establish for a
period of six months a mission in Somalia,” and authorized them “to take all
necessary measures as appropriate to carry out the following mandate.”).
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priate” to support dialogue and reconciliation, to offer protection to the TFG, and to contribute to the creation of security for
humanitarian assistance.251 However, as in Darfur, commentators have noted that the AU and U.N. efforts in Somalia have
been ineffective.252 Much of the difficulties have to do with the
lack of financial resources by the AU and of commitment from
the international community.253 Some of the difficulties faced
by the AU are also caused by member states’ reluctance to contribute their troops to a place such as Somalia, which is considered to be very dangerous.254
However, the AU still continues to intervene in Somalia. Analysts are reported to have acknowledged that “the [AU] has
done a better job of pacifying Mogadishu . . . than any other
outside force, including 25,000 American troops in 1990s.255
Further, the AU has recently received some assistance from
member states such as Kenya,256 Ethiopia,257 and Sierra Leone.258 If the AMISOM succeeds, this may be a huge boost to the
AU, as the internal armed conflict in Somalia has been ongoing
for over twenty years.
D. Assessment
Interventions by the AU in the cases described above are
conducted at the invitation or through the consent of the member states pursuant to Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. This
251. See id.
252. See Paul Williams, Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union
Mission in Somalia, 16 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 514, 515–527 (2009); Pham, supra note 227, at 147; Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 60–61.
253. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 61 (concluding that “the recent intervention in Somalia shows that the AU is unable to undertake complex peacekeeping functions without calling for UN and international assistance”).
254. Id. (citing Williams, supra note 252, at 515, 527).
255. Jeffrey Gettleman, African Force Makes Strides Inside Somalia, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/world/africa/africaforces-surprise-many-with-success-in-subduingsomalia.html?pagewanted=all.
256. Id.
257. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Ethiopian Troops Said to Enter Somalia, Opening New Front against Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/world/africa/ethiopian-troops-entersomalia-witnesses-say.html?_r=2.
258. See Josh Kron, Sierra Leone to Send Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/world/africa/somalia-sierraleone-to-send-troops.html.
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means that the AU has not yet exercised its right to intervene
as envisaged in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which does
not require the consent of member states.259 This can be attributed to the fact that under the Constitutive Act, a collective
decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the AU Assembly is required for intervention purposes,260 and the AU only
meets twice a year.261 Thus, intervention is not expected to take
place if the two-thirds majority of the AU Assembly has not
been reached, irrespective of whether international crimes
mentioned in the Constitutive Act are being committed. Furthermore, “given the continent’s traditional reluctance to endorse interventionism . . . the likelihood of securing a twothirds majority in the face of a hostile host must be considered
slim at best.”262 Therefore, invoking Article 4(h) authority in
order to intervene in member states could only be “timeconsuming and fraught with political obstacles.”263
It appears, then, that intervention may not happen at all or
may happen too late, as was the case with Rwanda,264 Darfur,265 and in Libya recently.266 On February 15, 2011, the
259. Lieblich, supra note 1, at 370–71.
260. Constitutive Act art. 7(1).
261. Id. art. 6(3) states that the Assembly meets once a year. The same provision also states that the Assembly can meet on extraordinary session requested by a member state and on approval by a two-thirds majority of the
Assembly. Id. However, due to its “increasing responsibilities . . . in addressing the challenges facing the Continent,” the Assembly has decided to meet
twice a year. See AU, Decision on the Periodicity of the Ordinary Sessions of
the Assembly, ¶¶ 3, 4, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.53 (III) Rev.1 (July 6–8,
2004).
262. BELLAMY, supra note 61, 78–79.
263. Id. at 78.
264. See Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 51 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein
eds., 2004) (observing that while genocide was being committed in Rwanda,
the international community, including the OAU, continued to receive representatives of the Rwandan government committing genocide to sit in at the
U.N. Security Council and OAU summit meetings).
265. The PSC formed AU High-Level Panel on Darfur to submit recommendations on “accountability and combating impunity, on the one hand, and
reconciliation and healing on the other” a week after the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against President Al Bashir and five years after
the Darfur conflict broke. See PSC, AU, Communiqué of the 142d Meeting of
the Peace and Security Council, ¶ 11, A.U. Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII)
Rev.1 (July 21, 2008); see also Situation in Darfur, Sudan: Prosecutor v.
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masses of Libya decided to hold a peaceful demonstration seeking a regime change.267 The Gadhafi government responded
through the use of force, leading to deaths and internal displacement of Libyan civilians.268 The AU formed a panel to look
into the situation in Libya only a week before the Security
Council passed a resolution that authorized a no-fly zone over
Libya.269 An inference can be drawn that as a result of this delay,270 NATO took over the situation.271 This raises concerns as
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (June 15,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlBashirEng.pdf. The
Report of the Panel, dubbed the Mbeki Panel Report on Darfur after its chair
and former President Thabo Mbeki, was endorsed by the AU on October 29,
2009. See Paul Okolo & Maram Mazen, African Union Leaders Accept Mbeki
Report on Darfur Conflict, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2009, 7:38 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aIg0Q1H8F6UA
; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, U.N. Press Release SC/9831, AFR/1925 (Dec. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9831.doc.htm; see also PSC, AU,
Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), at vii, xiii,
xvi, A.U. Doc. PSC/AHG/2 (CCVII) (Oct. 29, 2009).
266. The AU’s plans for Libya were overtaken by swift response from the
United States, France, and Britain to the Security Council’s resolution on the
situation there. See AU Panel Says Opposed to Foreign Military Intervention
in Libya: Media Report, XINHUA NEWS (Mar. 20, 2011, 04:45 AM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-03/20/c_13788058.htm
(additionally noting that the call for the western countries’ intervention was
also at the invitation of some Arab countries after a meeting with their western counterparts in Paris) [hereinafter AU Opposed to Foreign Intervention].
267. See Battle for Libya: Key Moment: Timeline of Decisive Battles and Political Developments in Libya’s Uprising Against Muammar Gaddafi, AL
JAZEERA
(Aug.
23,
2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/08/2011821912730343
2.html.
268. Id.
269. See AU Opposed to Foreign Intervention, supra note 266.
270. Thabo Mbeki, How the West Won Control over Africa, THE HERALD
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201104080011.html (Referring to
the events that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Mbeki noted that Africans were “unable to quickly decide how we should respond [and] instinctively resolved that we had no choice but to stand back and wait.”). Mbeki also
argued that by adopting Resolution 1973, which prescribed the foreign military intervention that “Africa had rejected,” the West “dismissed the notion
and practice of finding African solutions to African problems.” Id.
271. Id. Although Mbeki refers to the UN and the “West” taking charge in
Libya, it is well known that it is actually NATO that heeded the Security
Council’s call in terms of Resolution 1973. See NATO, NATO and Libya,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
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to whether the AU Assembly has, in fact, changed its stance of
non-intervention in internal armed conflicts.
Lack of financial resources and unwillingness by member
states to contribute finances and troops hamper the work of the
AU. Without proper funding, the AU will fail in its missions.
Indeed, the “lack of funding for AU operations” and many
member states defaulting on their annual contributions are
huge obstacles to the AU’s efficient operation.272 It is crucial
that the member states make their annual contributions to the
AU’s budget, and the AU Assembly takes it seriously when the
member states default on their contributions. In this regard,
the Constitutive Act gives the AU Assembly the power to issue
sanctions against the defaulting states.273 The sanctions include the “denial of the right to speak at meetings, to vote, to
present candidates for any position or post within the [AU] or
to benefit from any activity or commitments” within the AU.274
Furthermore, the missions were authorized and mandated by
the Security Council.275 Therefore, it seems that, at least for
the time being, the AU will have to rely on the U.N. assistance
to carry out its mandates effectively.
CONCLUSION
The following observations can be made regarding the AU’s
right to intervention: First, this discussion is evidence that Africa is making progress in dealing with international crimes
that are committed during armed conflict by reserving for itself
the right to intervene in a member states where such crimes
are being committed. This is further evidenced by the creation
of organs that aim to enable the AU to deal with international
2012) (“Following the Qadhafi regime’s targeting of civilians in February
2011, NATO answered the United Nations’ (UN) call to the international
community to protect the Libyan people. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO
Allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly
zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the
threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP). OUP successfully concluded on 31 October 2011.”).
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crimes within the region. However, this does not mean that the
African community can solve these problems in isolation from
the international community as a whole, as there is nothing in
the U.N. Charter that states a regional organization has priority over the Security Council and that the Security Council
must step aside when the regional organization decides to act
locally to stop atrocities.
Second, the fact that the AU has not exercised its right to intervene pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act—which
does not require the consent of states—shows that the AU has
not completely rid itself of the impediments brought about by
the principles of sovereignty which have largely crippled the
OAU in the past. Thabo Mbeki, the former AU Chairperson
and former President of South Africa, has said:
[W]e have to agree that we cannot be ruled by a doctrine of
absolute sovereignty. We should not allow the fact of the independence of each one our countries to turn us into spectators when crimes against the people are being committed . . . .
As independent states we have developed in the context of a
largely unbridled respect for the notion of the national sovereignty. We must therefore foresee somewhat of a struggle to
ensure that the approach adopted by the [AU] . . . wins the
day.276

Thirdly, the financial situation within the AU also hinders
the AU from exercising its duties, including exercising the
right to intervene. Fourth and most importantly, the AU still
needs to clarify what the right to intervene means. In order to
do so, there is an urgent need for the AU to ensure that the African Court of Justice or the African Court of Justice and Human Rights becomes operational in order to interpret the provisions of the Constitutive Act on intervention. Once these
courts are fully established, one should hope that nothing will
hinder the AU from exercising its right to intervene because
Africa needs the AU leaders’ guarantees that they will promptly deal with any international crimes committed in the territory of member states during armed conflict.
276. Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa, Lectured Delivered as Part of
Activities Marking the Twentieth Anniversary of the Guardian at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Africa Will Emerge as the Hope of All
Humanity
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However, concerns about the AU’s ability to intervene come
to the surface when recognizing the fact that the only time the
AU is willing to act is (1) when there is an unconstitutional
change in government and (2) when the international community threatens to take over the situation. Therefore, while the
AU has reserved for itself a legal duty to intervene, its attitude
toward such a duty raises concerns because of its apparent adherence to the principles of non-interference and territorial integrity. Simultaneously, one may also argue that unless the AU
has a clear view of the meaning of the right to intervene in
terms of Article 4(h), it will be hard to exercise this right.
Despite the challenges outlined above, the AU has demonstrated that it is willing to intervene in cases where internal
armed conflicts threaten peace and security in Africa, as evidenced by its missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia. Although the missions have either been passed to the U.N. or are
still ongoing, the initial decision by the AU to undertake them
demonstrate the willingness to take the primary responsibility
for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed in the African region. There is hope that in time, and
through trials and tribulations, the AU may have a strong
chance of dealing with those international crimes that may adversely impact the peace and security of Africa.

